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Supplemental Security Income: An Overview
Summary and Introduction
In 1974, the federal government established the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program to provide 
cash assistance to people who are disabled, aged, or both 
and who have low income and few assets. SSI replaced 
several state-run support programs that had been partially 
financed by the federal government. In fiscal year 2013, 
the program will make payments to more than 8 million 
people at a cost to the federal government of about 
$53 billion, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimates.1
Currently, about 60 percent of SSI recipients are disabled 
adults (ages 18 to 64), about 15 percent are disabled 
children (under age 18), and about 25 percent are aged 
adults (age 65 or over) with or without disabilities.2 
SSI recipients generally are eligible for health insurance 
through Medicaid, and many also participate in other 
income-security programs that provide federal support to 
low-income people.
In the early 1990s, participation in SSI among people 
under the age of 65—that is, among disabled people—
increased substantially, in part because of changes in eligi-
bility rules. Such participation rose again between 2006 
and 2011, mainly because of the recession. In contrast, 
the share of the aged who participate in SSI has declined 
steadily during the past few decades as more women have 
qualified for Social Security retirement benefits and as 
average Social Security benefits have increased, leaving 
fewer aged people poor enough to qualify for SSI. All 
together, the number of SSI recipients has increased faster 
than the overall population during the past few decades.
At the same time, the average SSI payment has increased 
more slowly than total output (gross domestic product, or 
GDP) per person. As a result, federal SSI outlays have 
remained at about 0.3 percent of GDP since the early 
1990s.
In coming years, CBO projects that as the economy 
improves and average Social Security benefits continue to 
increase, the number of SSI beneficiaries will decline 
slightly as a share of the population. In addition, SSI pay-
ments per recipient are linked to prices, which tend to 
rise more slowly than GDP per person. As a result of 
those two factors, CBO projects that total outlays for SSI 
will decline slightly relative to total output over the next 
decade, reaching one-quarter of one percent of GDP. 
Proposals for changing SSI—some that would expand the 
program and others that would shrink it—can be 
grouped into four categories:
 Those that would adjust the parameters of the 
program, such as payment amounts or income or 
asset thresholds;
1. For additional background and data on the program, see Social 
Security Administration, Annual Report of the Supplemental 
Security Income Program (May 2012), http://go.usa.gov/Y4rW; 
SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2011 (September 2012), 
http://go.usa.gov/Y4rR; and Understanding Supplemental 
Security Income, 2012 Edition, accessed October 12, 2012, 
http://go.usa.gov/Y4rC. SSI recipients also can qualify on the 
basis of blindness; about 1 percent do. For the purposes of this 
report, disabled recipients includes people who are blind.
2. In other analyses, the Congressional Budget Office and the 
Social Security Administration categorize as disabled adults 
recipients who are over the age of 65 and who receive payments on 
the basis of disability before they turn 65; in those other analyses, 
only those who are awarded payments solely on the basis of age are 
identified as aged recipients. About half of SSI recipients over age 
65 first qualify for SSI on the basis of disability.
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Figure 1.
Supplemental Security Income Recipients and Total Monthly Payments, by 
Type of Recipient
(Percentage of total)
Source: Social Security Administration.
Note: Data are for October 2012.
a. Includes federally administered state supplements.
 Those that would change the criteria used to deter-
mine who qualifies for SSI on the basis of disability; 
 Those that would establish more frequent reviews of 
recipients’ continuing eligibility; and
 Those that would more fundamentally change the 
program, for example by expanding programs to 
support work by people who qualify for SSI under 
current law, by creating a separate program for chil-
dren, or by transferring control of the program to the 
states.
Who Receives SSI Payments?
As of October 2012, the SSI program had about 8.3 mil-
lion recipients, classified into three groups (see Figure 1). 
The largest group consists of disabled adults ages 18 to 
64. That group accounts for 59 percent of the program’s 
recipients and receives 62 percent of the program’s total 
payments. 
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), the other major 
federal program that provides cash benefits to people 
with disabilities, uses the same disability standard for 
working-age adults that applies in SSI, but it differs from 
SSI in several respects. For example, DI is available only 
to adults (and their dependents) who have a sufficient 
record of work, but past work is not a requirement for 
SSI eligibility. DI also places no limits on beneficiaries’ 
income or assets, but SSI recipients must have low 
income and few assets. In addition, DI is funded primar-
ily by means of a dedicated payroll tax, but SSI is funded 
out of general revenue.3 
Disabled children (under the age of 18) make up 
16 percent of SSI recipients and receive 19 percent of 
the program’s payments. The remaining 25 percent of 
SSI recipients are people age 65 or older; the average pay-
ments they receive are smaller, and they collect 19 percent 
of the program’s total payments. 
Most working-age and aged-adult recipients of SSI pay-
ments live in their own households. The most recent data 
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3. For more information, see Congressional Budget Office, 
Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program 
(July 2012), and Social Security Disability Insurance: Participation 
Trends and Their Fiscal Implications (July 2010).
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Figure 2.
Supplemental Security Income Recipients, by Type
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
available indicate that about half of working-age SSI 
recipients in 2006 had not graduated from high school or 
received a GED certification and that many lived in 
households with income below the federal poverty 
threshold.4
Disabled Adults Ages 18 to 64 
About 4.8 million people in the 18-to-64 age group—
about 2.4 percent of the U.S. population in that age 
group—received SSI payments in 2011 (see Figure 2). 
To qualify for SSI, those recipients must demonstrate 
that their disability prevents them from participating in 
“substantial gainful activity,” which in 2012 is considered 
to mean work that would produce earnings of more than 
$1,010 a month. (That amount is adjusted annually for 
average wage growth.) Older adults are more likely than 
younger adults are to receive payments: Fewer than 2 per-
cent of people between the ages of 18 and 29 receive 
payments; slightly more than 3 percent of people between 
the ages of 50 and 64 do. Especially among younger 
adults, eligibility for the program is determined most 
commonly on the basis of mental disability: Three-
quarters of participants ages 18 to 39 were awarded 
payments primarily because of a mental disorder. That 
share declines with age, as conditions such as spinal 
As a Share of the Total Population of the Same Age
Number(Millions of people)
(Percent)
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Disabled Children (Under 18)
Aged Adults (65+)
Disabled Adults (18–64)
Actual Projected
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022
0
2
4
6
8
10
Disabled Children (Under 18)
Aged Adults (65+)
Disabled Adults (18–64)
Actual Projected
4. The actual share of SSI recipients in poverty is not known. One 
analysis of the 2006 National Beneficiary Survey, which surveyed 
only SSI and Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries, 
contained an estimate that 70 percent of SSI recipients lived in 
poverty; see Gina Livermore, David Stapleton, and Allison Roche, 
Work Activity and Use of Employment Supports Under the Original 
Ticket to Work Regulations: Characteristics, Employment, and 
Sources of Support Among Working-Age SSI and DI Beneficiaries 
(report submitted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., to 
the Social Security Administration, April 2009), p. 8, 
www.mathematica-mpr.com/disability/tickettowork.asp. An anal-
ysis of earlier data from the Current Population Survey showed a 
substantially lower poverty rate for that group, about 40 percent 
in 2002; see Joyce Nicholas and Michael Wiseman, “Elderly Pov-
erty and Supplemental Security Income,” Social Security Bulletin, 
vol. 69, no. 1 (May 2009), pp. 45–73, http://go.usa.gov/g4QQ.
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Figure 3.
New Supplemental Security Income Recipients as a Share of the
Total Population of the Same Age
(Percent)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
disorders and heart disease become more prevalent. 
Among SSI recipients between the ages of 60 and 64, 
for example, one-third receive payments because of 
mental disorders, one-quarter receive payments because 
of musculoskeletal disorders, and one-tenth receive pay-
ments because of circulatory disorders. Because people 
who qualify on the basis of a physical disorder tend to be 
awarded payments at later ages, they generally spend less 
time in the program.
The share of adults ages 18 to 64 receiving SSI payments 
has increased over time, rising from slightly more than 
1 percent of the population 30 years ago to more 
than 2 percent today. The change accelerated in the early 
1990s, in part because of a loosening of disability stan-
dards for mental and musculoskeletal disorders that was 
passed in the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform 
Act of 1984 and implemented in subsequent years. That 
rule change increased the weight placed on applicants’ 
ability to function, thus reducing the weight put on med-
ical diagnoses. Applications for SSI also increased in the 
early 1990s because the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) stepped up its public outreach regarding the 
program.5 
The share of working-age adults receiving SSI payments 
also has increased when jobs have been especially difficult 
to obtain, such as during the early 1990s and in the past 
several years. During those periods, SSI applications tend 
to rise, and more people enter the program (see Figure 3). 
CBO projects that, as the economy improves in coming 
years, the number of new, disabled-adult recipients will 
decline and then stabilize, falling from 734,000 in 2010 
to about 600,000 in 2016 and thereafter. As a share of the 
population, the number of disabled-adult recipients will 
reach 2.5 percent in 2013, CBO projects, and will remain 
at about that percentage for the following decade. 
Disabled Children Under Age 18 
Children who qualify for SSI must be disabled and, in 
most cases, must live in a household with low income and 
few assets. To be considered disabled, a child must have a 
physical or mental impairment that results in marked and 
severe functional limitations and that is either expected to 
last for at least 12 consecutive months or to result in 
death. Most child recipients—three-quarters of recipients 
between the ages of 5 and 17 and one-third of those 
under the age of 5—qualify because of a mental disorder. 
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5. Jerry L. Mashaw and Virginia P. Reno, eds., Balancing Security and 
Opportunity: The Challenge of Disability Income Policy (Disability 
Policy Panel, National Academy of Social Insurance, 1996), p. 70, 
www.nasi.org/research/1996/balancing-security-opportunity
-challenge-disability-income. 
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Disabled children normally require more support 
than other children do, and SSI payments help parents 
and other caregivers pay for disability-related expenses 
and help compensate for the lower wages that parents 
might earn because of the demands of caring for a dis-
abled child. In all, 1.3 million disabled children are SSI 
recipients, or about 1 in 60 of those under the age of 18. 
The rolls of disabled children receiving SSI payments 
increased gradually after the program was established in 
1974, and by the 1980s, about 0.3 percent of children 
were SSI recipients (see Figure 2 on page 3). In that 
period, the determination of disability was based entirely 
on specific diagnoses, called medical factors. In 1990, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Sullivan v. Zebley invalidated 
the SSA’s child disability regulation, and children were 
then able to qualify on the basis of functional limitations, 
such as the inability to walk or to attend school.6 The 
number of new, disabled-child recipients spiked after the 
Zebley decision, growing from less than 0.1 percent of 
children to more than 0.3 percent in 1993 (see Figure 3). 
As a result, the number of new child recipients more than 
quadrupled, from about 50,000 in 1989 to 240,000 in 
1993, by which time 1.0 percent of all children were SSI 
recipients. 
The broad-based welfare reforms enacted in 1996 had 
countervailing effects on the number of children receiv-
ing SSI payments. On the one hand, lawmakers tightened 
the definition of functional limitations for children, 
which tended to reduce SSI applications for children. On 
the other hand, benefit rules for Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF, a new program established at 
that time) that were stricter than those for Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (the program that TANF 
replaced) led some poor parents to seek support for their 
children through SSI instead. In addition, because SSI is 
funded entirely by the federal government, whereas 
TANF is funded in part by the states, the states have an 
incentive to encourage residents to apply for SSI. On 
balance, the share of children receiving SSI payments 
declined slightly after welfare reform before resuming an 
upward trend in 2000. 
Rising poverty also seems to have contributed to growth 
in the number of child SSI recipients. Simply being poor 
is not a guarantee that an applicant will meet the SSI 
income and asset tests, but poor people are more likely 
to meet those tests, so an increase in the poverty rate 
generally leads to an increase in the number of SSI recipi-
ents. Between 2005 and 2011, both the number of poor 
children and the number of children who received SSI 
increased by about 25 percent; in 2011, 1.7 percent of all 
children were recipients. CBO projects that the share of 
children receiving SSI payments for the first time will 
decline slightly over the next few years as poverty rates fall 
because of an improving economy. However, the agency 
also projects that, as in past economic recoveries, the 
share of SSI recipients exiting the program will not 
change significantly, so the share of children in the pro-
gram will remain almost stable for the next decade.
Adults Age 65 or Older
People age 65 or older can qualify for SSI on the basis of 
low income and assets alone; they need not be disabled. 
As a result, people in that age group are more likely than 
younger people are to qualify for the program; about 
2.1 million, or 5 percent of the elderly population, do. 
(About half of those recipients qualified as disabled 
recipients before they turned 65.) 
The share of the aged population that receives payments 
has fallen by more than half since 1974 because of the 
increase in the share of that population eligible for Social 
Security and because of the real (inflation-adjusted) 
increase in the average Social Security benefit. Many 
more women now have had sufficient earnings to qualify 
for Social Security benefits based on their own work. In 
addition, the Social Security benefits that each new group 
of beneficiaries receives are linked to average wages in the 
economy, which generally increase faster than SSI bene-
fits, which are linked to prices. As more people qualified 
for Social Security benefits and as the benefit amounts 
rose, fewer people met SSI’s income standard. CBO 
projects that this long-standing downward trend in the 
share of aged adults who receive SSI payments will con-
tinue, with the share falling from about 5 percent to 
about 4 percent over the next 10 years. 
Spending for SSI
The federal government will spend about $53 billion on 
SSI payments in fiscal year 2013, about 3 percent more 
than it did in fiscal year 2012 (after accounting for6. 493 U.S.C. 521, 541 (1990). 
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Figure 4.
Federal Outlays for Supplemental Security Income Payments, by 
Type of Recipient
(Percentage of gross domestic product)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
differing number of payments), and it will spend an addi-
tional $4 billion to administer the program. Payments 
will represent about 1.6 percent of total federal outlays 
and 0.3 percent of GDP, roughly the same share of the 
economy that the program has claimed since the early 
1990s (see Figure 4). 
In the coming decade, CBO expects, the share of the 
population receiving SSI payments will decline slightly, 
for the reasons discussed above. In addition, SSI pay-
ments per recipient will grow more slowly than average 
earnings in the economy. As a result, total SSI outlays will 
grow more slowly than the economy, CBO projects, and 
fall to about one-quarter of one percent of GDP by fiscal 
year 2022.
Payments to Recipients in 2012
The maximum SSI payment is specified in law, and the 
amount someone receives is the difference between that 
maximum and the recipient’s “countable income,” a mea-
sure of that person’s income (for details, see “Income and 
Asset Limits” on page 8). People whose countable income 
exceeds the maximum are not eligible to receive SSI 
payments.
The current maximum monthly SSI federal payment is 
$698 for an individual or $1,048 for a couple, but most 
actual payments are lower; in October 2012, federal 
payments averaged $497 for all recipients. Forty-four 
states and the District of Columbia supplement federal 
payments for some or all recipients, and states can choose 
to administer payments or to have the federal govern-
ment determine eligibility and make payments. About 
one-quarter of all recipients receive federally administered 
state payments as well as payments funded by the federal 
government itself; federally administered state supple-
ments total about $3.5 billion annually, and state 
supplements administered by the states total about $1 bil-
lion annually. (States also can choose to provide payments 
to people who are ineligible for federal SSI because of 
excess income. Only 3 percent of SSI recipients receive 
federally administered state payments without federal 
payments.) The average federally administered state 
supplement in October 2012 was $122.7
Payments for aged adults tend to be lower than those for 
younger recipients, in part because many recipients who 
are 65 or older also receive Social Security benefits, thus 
reducing their SSI payments. In October 2012, federal 
monthly SSI payments to aged adults averaged $380, dis-
abled adults received $516, and children received $607. 
Actual Projected
Disabled Children (Under 18)
Aged Adults (65+)
Disabled Adults (18–64)
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7. For sample data on monthly payments by eligibility category, age, 
and source of payment, see Social Security Administration, 
Research, Statistics, and Policy Analysis, “SSI Monthly Statistics, 
October 2012,” Table 7, http://go.usa.gov/g45H. 
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(As a result of federally administered state supplemental 
payments to some recipients, aged adults received a total 
of $415 in monthly SSI payments, disabled adults 
received $533, and children received $615, on average.) 
Trends in Payments
Since 1983, SSI payments have been indexed to inflation, 
as measured by growth in the consumer price index for 
urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-W). 
Therefore, the purchasing power of those payments (as 
measured using the CPI-W) has remained constant. 
However, the payments have shrunk relative to average 
earnings, which tend to grow faster than inflation. In 
1984, the maximum individual SSI payment was 23 per-
cent of average earnings (as measured by the national 
average wage index, according to SSA). By 2011, that 
ratio had declined by about one-fifth, to 19 percent of 
average earnings. CBO projects that earnings growth will 
continue to outpace inflation and that SSI payments 
will continue to gradually decline as a share of average 
earnings.
In CBO’s baseline projections, which generally 
follow current law, outlays for SSI payments grow from 
$51 billion in fiscal year 2012 to $68 billion by fiscal year 
2022. As a share of GDP, however, outlays are projected 
to decline by about one-fifth over that period, from 
0.33 percent of GDP today to 0.27 percent in 2022. 
(Those projections adjust outlays to account for the varia-
tion in the number of monthly payments per fiscal year; 
in most years there are 12, but in some years the October 
1 payment date falls on a weekend, resulting in 11 or 
13 payments during a given fiscal year.)
How Does SSI Work?
Program eligibility rules differ somewhat for each type of 
recipient.8 People with qualifying disabilities, income, 
and assets who meet other eligibility criteria receive 
monthly payments based on current income or, in some 
cases, the income of a spouse or parent, and payments fall 
as income rises. Eligibility for payments ends if the dis-
abling condition improves or if income or assets rise 
above the eligibility thresholds.
Qualifying Disabilities
Disability determination services (DDSs), which are run 
by states but funded by the federal government, assess 
whether children and adults under age 65 meet the dis-
ability criteria for SSI. Although SSI is separate from the 
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insur-
ance (DI) programs of Social Security, SSA administers 
all three. Slightly fewer than half of adult applicants 
under age 65 who meet the financial criteria for the 
program are ultimately approved for payments. 
Applications for SSI, like DI applications, are filed with 
SSA, which first determines whether an applicant’s 
income and assets are low enough to meet the standards 
for eligibility (discussed below). If that determination is 
positive, a DDS then reviews a case file and rules on 
whether the applicant is sufficiently disabled to qualify. 
About one in three applications reviewed by a DDS is 
approved.9 
Roughly 40 percent of all applications by disabled 
adults that initially are denied by a DDS are appealed. In 
40 states and the District of Columbia, the appeals are 
then heard at what is known as the reconsideration level, 
in which, depending on the reason for rejection, the 
decision is reviewed either by the DDS or by SSA; only 
about 10 percent of such appeals result in an approval. In 
the 10 states without the reconsideration level, appeals 
advance automatically to the next level.
More than two-thirds of the people whose applications 
are denied at the reconsideration level appeal again, this 
time to an administrative law judge (ALJ); those judges 
also hear all cases from states without reconsideration.10 
In most such cases, the earlier denial is reversed, and 
about one-quarter of all awards to disabled adults are 
made by ALJs. Although it is not known precisely why 
ALJs reverse so many earlier rulings, several factors 
probably contribute:
8. For details on issues summarized in this section, see Social 
Security Administration, Understanding Supplemental Security 
Income (2012), http://go.usa.gov/g4NG.
9. SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2011 (September 2012), Table 69, 
“Outcomes of Applications for Disability Benefits,” 
http://go.usa.gov/Y4rR. About one-quarter of applications are 
rejected by SSA for nonmedical reasons, such as income or assets 
that exceed the program limits, and about one-half are rejected by 
DDSs because the applicants are judged not to be disabled. 
10. ALJs are judges who preside over administrative trials and hearings 
on claims made by individuals affected by agency determinations 
or decisions.
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 More applicants have legal representation at a hearing 
before an ALJ than they have earlier. 
 In some cases, the medical disorder worsens between 
the time of the initial application and the time of the 
appeal hearing.
 DDS employees have an incentive to deny 
applications because those results are not as likely 
to be reviewed by SSA as approvals are. In contrast, 
approvals handed down by ALJs are not reviewed, 
and their denials can be appealed first to an Appeals 
Council and then to the federal courts, although few 
applicants choose to do so. 
 DDS examiners review only the case file, but ALJs 
typically meet applicants in person, thus allowing 
applicants to respond directly to questions. In addi-
tion, whereas it is common for applicants to have 
lawyers or other representation at the hearings, SSA 
has no legal representation to advocate against an 
application at a hearing. 
Relatively fewer appeals are filed on behalf of children 
than are filed for adults whose applications have been 
rejected, and ALJs are less likely to reverse the decision to 
deny a child’s application than an application for an 
adult. As a result, more than 90 percent of awards to chil-
dren are made at the initial DDS review. In recent years, 
about 40 percent of child applicants have been accepted 
into the program.11
Income and Asset Limits
About one-quarter of all applicants are disqualified on the 
basis of financial resources. To be eligible for payments, 
recipients’ assets and their countable income must fall 
below statutory thresholds. The amount of payments is 
reduced by the amount of recipients’ countable income. 
Several sources of income are not countable:
 The first $20 of income received in a month from any 
source, in addition to other types of excluded income 
listed below;
 The first $65 of wages and self-employment income, 
and half of the remaining amount;
 The value of in-kind benefits, such as food stamps or 
heating assistance, as well as need-based assistance 
from state and local agencies; and
 Money from loans, grants, and scholarships.
The income of parents of children under 18 is generally 
considered (or “deemed”) to be available to those children 
and is included in the computation of countable income 
for a potential or accepted child recipient. For married 
adults of all ages, the income of a spouse with whom the 
recipient lives is deemed to be available to the recipient. 
Countable income includes cash received from friends or 
relatives but excludes money spent by other people for 
expenses other than food or shelter.12 SSI recipients must 
apply for all other available private and public sources of 
income, including benefits from other means-tested pro-
grams, pensions, Social Security, and unemployment 
insurance. 
In addition to meeting low-income criteria, recipients 
must have minimal assets. Specifically, their “countable 
resources” must total less than $2,000 for a single person 
or $3,000 in joint assets for married people. Countable 
resources include financial assets and most other items 
that could be sold. Exceptions include a home, household 
goods, and one vehicle. (Applicants who give away assets 
or sell them for less than their market value may have to 
wait up to 36 months to qualify for SSI payments.) 
Other Eligibility Criteria
In general, SSI applicants must be U.S. citizens. (Until 
1996, legal permanent residents also were eligible.) How-
ever, immigrants who arrived in the United States by 
August 1996 and those who have worked enough to 
qualify for Social Security retirement benefits can collect 
SSI payments if they are otherwise eligible to do so. In 
general, refugees and people who have been granted 
asylum are eligible for seven years after they enter or are 
granted asylum here. In 2008, that period was tempo-
rarily extended (until the end of fiscal year 2011) to nine 
years. In general, residents of nursing homes or other 
medical institutions for whom more than half the cost of 
care is paid by Medicaid receive a federal monthly SSI 
payment of $30; residents of public medical facilities and 
prisoners are ineligible.
11. SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2011 (September 2012), 
Table 69, “Outcomes of Applications for Disability Benefits,” 
http://go.usa.gov/Y4rR.
12. However, payments are reduced by one-third for recipients who 
live in another person’s household and do not pay for food and 
shelter.
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Exiting the Program
SSI recipients become ineligible when a disabling condi-
tion improves sufficiently or their income or assets rise 
above the eligibility thresholds. To ascertain whether 
recipients continue to have qualifying disabilities, they 
are subject to continuing disability reviews (CDRs). By 
law, CDRs are required for low-birth-weight infants on 
their first birthday and for disabled children who have 
reached the age of 18. About half of the infants and more 
than one-third of the 18-year-olds are found to be no 
longer disabled.13 The frequency of review for other cases 
depends on the estimated likelihood of recovery and on 
funding available for reviews. Each year, about 1 percent 
of disabled adult SSI recipients leave the program after 
their disabling condition improves. Very few SSI recipi-
ents (less than 1 percent) leave the program each year 
because their own earnings increase.
How Does SSI Interact with Other 
Government Programs?
SSI recipients often participate in other government 
support programs, including Social Security, Medicaid, 
TANF, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp 
program). 
Social Security
Many SSI recipients in the disabled-adult and aged-adult 
categories also qualify for Social Security benefits; such 
recipients are known as dual beneficiaries. About 25 per-
cent of disabled-adult SSI recipients also receive Social 
Security DI benefits, and about 55 percent of aged-adult 
SSI recipients also receive Social Security benefits, mostly 
from Social Security’s retirement program, Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance. Because Social Security benefits 
represent countable income for SSI, SSI payments are 
reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount of Social Secu-
rity benefits after taking into account the $20 monthly 
general income exclusion. In effect, the SSI payment is a 
floor on the sum of SSI and Social Security benefits. 
Qualifying for SSI is valuable even for recipients who 
qualify for DI benefits that are equal to or larger than 
their SSI payments because qualifying for SSI can provide 
earlier access both to cash and to medical benefits. First, 
SSI payments begin immediately after the payment is 
awarded, whereas DI benefit payments begin five months 
after the onset of disability. Second, SSI recipients qualify 
for Medicaid health benefits immediately, whereas DI 
recipients become eligible for Medicare 24 months after 
becoming eligible for DI benefits. 
Medicaid 
People who qualify for SSI also generally qualify for Med-
icaid benefits. (In 39 states and the District of Columbia, 
qualification is automatic; in 11 states, Medicaid eligibil-
ity rules differ from the SSI rules, but SSI recipients in 
those states generally qualify for Medicaid as well.) Gain-
ing Medicaid eligibility through SSI is most valuable for 
disabled adults—and most costly to the government—
because that group tends to have significant medical 
needs. Most disabled adults are not eligible for Medicare 
because they are too young to qualify on the basis of age 
and have not had enough work history to qualify for 
Social Security DI benefits. Medicaid is also valuable for 
disabled children, but most of them would qualify for 
that or other health care programs separately from SSI. 
Average Medicaid outlays for aged recipients are lower 
than they are for younger recipients because Medicare is 
usually the primary source of health insurance for the 
aged and Medicaid pays only the costs that Medicare does 
not cover. (However, average Medicaid costs are very high 
for those who receive long-term care.) In 2011, the 
annual federal Medicaid costs for disabled-adult recipi-
ents of SSI averaged $9,250; for disabled-child recipients, 
they averaged $8,300; and for aged-adult recipients, they 
averaged $5,840.14
For people who expect to have large health care costs, a 
significant incentive for applying for SSI is to receive 
Medicaid benefits.15 However, about 70 percent of SSI 
recipients would qualify for Medicaid even if they were 
13. Social Security Administration, Annual Report of Continuing 
Disability Reviews, Fiscal Year 2010 (transmitted to the Honorable 
Joseph R. Biden Jr. and the Honorable John A. Boehner on 
May 1, 2012), http://go.usa.gov/YyPC. 
14. Federal Medicaid costs for beneficiaries who were not on SSI were 
substantially lower because such beneficiaries are much less likely 
than SSI recipients to be disabled and therefore likely to use less 
health care. In 2011, those costs averaged $1,350 for children, 
$1,760 for adults, and $3,430 for aged Medicaid beneficiaries.
15. For information on how eligibility for SSI and DI affects access 
to Medicare and Medicaid, see Kalman Rupp and Gerald F. Riley, 
“Longitudinal Patterns of Medicaid and Medicare Coverage 
Among Disability Cash Benefit Awardees,” Social Security 
Bulletin, vol. 72, no. 3 (August 2012), pp.19–35, 
http://go.usa.gov/g4Uh.
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not SSI recipients because they are members of other 
qualifying groups, such as low-income children or their 
parents.
Beginning in 2014, the Affordable Care Act will allow 
states to choose to expand Medicaid coverage to anyone 
whose income is below 138 percent of the federal poverty 
level.16 In states that do so, almost all SSI recipients will 
be eligible for Medicaid based on income alone, even if 
they do not qualify for SSI. SSI recipients who are not 
eligible for Medicaid but whose income is equal to or 
above 100 percent of the poverty level will be eligible for 
subsidized insurance through the exchanges that will be 
established under the Affordable Care Act.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Poor families with children may qualify for cash pay-
ments through the state-administered TANF program, 
and they also may qualify for SSI if their children meet 
SSI’s disability criteria. States receive federal funding for 
TANF in fixed amounts, in contrast with SSI, under 
which federal outlays change with the number of recipi-
ents. Because of that difference in funding structures, 
increasing SSI payments to TANF beneficiaries gives 
states additional overall resources. Families that receive 
TANF benefits also can be better off when they qualify 
for SSI because they generally receive larger total pay-
ments.17 Therefore, states have an incentive to ensure that 
TANF beneficiaries receive any SSI payments for which 
they qualify. In 2006, about one-sixth of TANF families 
included at least one person receiving SSI. 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Many SSI recipients also qualify for food assistance, most 
commonly through SNAP.18 About half of households 
that receive SSI payments also receive SNAP benefits. 
Although the eligibility criteria for the two programs 
differ, a demonstration project, the SSI Combined 
Application Project, is experimenting with an integrated 
process for applications and benefit computations. Partic-
ipation in that project is generally limited to aged people 
who live alone and have no income from earnings.19 
In fiscal year 2010, 18 states had demonstrations of 
the project, and about 8 percent of all SSI recipients 
participated. 
How Much Does SSI Affect People’s 
Work and Saving?
Any program that provides benefits only to low-income 
applicants who have few assets will, to some extent, dis-
courage work and saving. SSI is intended to provide 
income to adults with limited financial resources who 
cannot perform substantial work, but the dividing line 
between those who can and cannot perform substantial 
work is not always clear. Some people who are currently 
employed have medical conditions that would allow 
them to qualify for the program if they stopped working. 
That fact and the incentives inherent in the program sug-
gest that if the program did not exist, if payments were 
lower, or if income and asset limitations were less strin-
gent, at least some people receiving payments from such 
programs would work more or save more. However, SSI 
recipients who are disabled adults have been judged, 
through the disability determination process, to be 
unable to perform substantial work, and SSI payment 
amounts and asset limits are low, so most SSI recipients 
probably could not earn or save significant amounts.
Incentives Created by SSI Payments to 
Disabled Adults
Work behavior among disabled adults is affected by the 
fact that SSI payments are reduced by 50 cents for each 
dollar of earnings after the first $65. That reduction in 
payments is effectively a tax on earnings, which reduces 
the incentive to work. 
However, most adults who qualify for SSI on the basis of 
a disability probably would not work much even in the 
absence of SSI. Among the considerations supporting 
that conclusion are the following four:
16. See Congressional Budget Office, Estimates for the Insurance 
Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent 
Supreme Court Decision (July 2012). The Affordable Care Act 
comprises the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and 
the health care provisions of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010.
17. Steve Wamhoff and Michael Wiseman, “The TANF/SSI 
Connection,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 66, no. 4 (2005/2006), 
pp. 21–36, http://go.usa.gov/g2rW. 
18. Brad Trenkamp and Michael Wiseman, “The Food Stamp 
Program and Supplemental Security Income,” Social Security 
Bulletin, vol. 67, no. 4 (2007, released June 2008), pp. 71–87, 
http://go.usa.gov/g2gB.
19. Mathematica Policy Research, Technical Documentation for the 
Fiscal Year 2010 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Quality 
Control Database and the QC Minimodel (report submitted to 
the Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 
September 2011).
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 Most disabled-adult SSI recipients have little or no 
work history; according to one study, fewer than one-
third were working at the time they became disabled.20 
 A disabled adult with a significant work history can 
generally receive more from Social Security DI bene-
fits than from SSI payments, so the availability of SSI 
is unlikely to affect such a person’s decision to work. 
 SSI payments are much lower than are earnings from 
even low-wage work: Excluding the effects of fringe 
benefits and taxes, which are generally small for 
people with low wages, the earnings for full-time 
minimum-wage work are more than twice the average 
SSI payment. However, some participants might only 
be able to work limited hours or sporadically, in which 
case the SSI benefit could be comparable to or greater 
than their potential earnings.
 As discussed below, few disabled-adult recipients 
return to work even though SSI includes provisions 
designed to mitigate work disincentives.
In the other direction, among the considerations that 
suggest that some SSI beneficiaries would work more in 
the absence of SSI are the following:
 Giving up SSI sometimes entails the loss of Medicaid 
benefits and the loss of benefits from other programs 
that assist low-income people.21 
 For various reasons, including the time and effort 
required for work, some recipients probably prefer 
receiving SSI payments instead of working.
Because DI benefits can be higher than SSI payments 
and because DI sets no limits on assets or nonwage 
income, adults who qualified for SSI as children have 
an incentive to work for long enough to qualify for DI 
benefits. Still, that incentive is dampened by the existence 
of SSI payments.
The SSI asset limit is unlikely to have a large effect on 
savings. Most low-income families have little opportunity 
to save and few financial assets. 
Incentives Created by SSI Payments to Aged Adults
In the years before they turn 65, some people who are not 
disabled probably work less and save less because they 
expect to receive SSI when they reach age 65, especially if 
they live in states where SSI supplements are larger.22 For 
example, a 60-year-old man could know that his Social 
Security benefit will be lower than his SSI payment no 
matter how much he works. In that case, any additional 
work by him would result in more earnings, but it would 
not increase the total payments he would receive after 
turning 65. In addition, if he expects to receive SSI pay-
ments, he might consider it less important to prepare for 
retirement by saving or by accruing pension benefits. 
Because only a small portion of workers expect to receive 
SSI, and because the behavior of only some of those 
workers is affected, the effect of SSI payments to aged 
adults on overall work and saving is small.
Incentives Created by SSI Payments to 
Disabled Children
When SSI recipients turn 18, the Social Security 
Administration assesses their eligibility for continuing 
in the disabled-adult program; about two-thirds of child 
recipients at that age meet the SSI eligibility criteria for 
disabled adults.23 CBO is aware of no analysis that dem-
onstrates the influence of SSI payments on the future 
work patterns of child recipients. On the one hand, 
disabled-child SSI recipients who anticipate continuing 
to receive payments as adults may be discouraged 
themselves, or be discouraged by their parents or other 
advocates, from pursuing entry-level jobs or from seeking 
the type of education that would prepare them to enter 
the workforce. In addition, some parents might believe 
20. John Bound, Richard Burkhauser, and Austin Nichols, “Tracking 
the Household Income of SSDI and SSI Applicants,” in Solomon 
Polachek, ed., Worker Well-Being and Public Policy: Research in 
Labor Economics (Elsevier JAI Press, 2003), pp. 113–158.
21. See Congressional Budget Office, Effective Marginal Tax Rates for 
Low- and Moderate-Income Workers (November 2012). 
22. David Neumark and Elizabeth Powers, “Welfare for the Elderly: 
The Effects of SSI on Preretirement Labor Supply,” Journal of 
Public Economics, vol. 78, nos. 1–2 (2000), pp. 51–80, 
www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00472727/78/1-2.
23. Jeffrey Hemmeter, Jacqueline Kauff, and David Wittenburg, 
“Changing Circumstances: Experiences of Child SSI Recipients 
Before and After Their Age-18 Redetermination for Adult 
Benefits,” Journal of Vocational Rehabilitation, vol. 30, no. 3 
(2009), p. 211. For additional information, see Jeffrey Hemmeter 
and Elaine Gilby, “The Age-18 Redetermination and Post-
redetermination Participation in SSI,” Social Security Bulletin, 
vol. 69, no. 4 (December 2009), pp.1–25, http://go.usa.gov/
g24V.
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that a child’s designation as disabled by a school system or 
other agency will improve the chance of a successful SSI 
application. That designation or actions that the parents 
might take to get the child’s disability officially recog-
nized could result in the child’s being moved to a weaker 
educational track, or otherwise reduce the child’s educa-
tional preparation, in a way that limits his or her pros-
pects for adult work.24 On the other hand, SSI payments 
to a disabled child might help his or her parents support 
the child’s development, and a designation as disabled 
might give a child access to other support services that 
improve his or her ability to work upon reaching 
adulthood.25 
The availability of SSI payments for disabled children 
could reduce the work effort of those children’s parents 
because the reduction of 50 cents for every dollar’s 
increase in earnings is a disincentive for some parents to 
work. However, any effect of this sort appears to be 
small.26
Programs to Encourage Work
Several provisions of SSI are designed to mitigate work 
disincentives for disabled-adult recipients. Two in partic-
ular reduce the cost of returning to work: 
 People whose income is above what is known as the 
substantial gainful activity amount, currently $1,010 
a month, do not generally qualify for SSI. However, 
section 1619 of the Social Security Act provides that 
people who already receive SSI payments may con-
tinue to do so indefinitely, even when their earnings 
rise above that threshold, so long as they remain 
eligible otherwise. (Payments are still reduced by the 
amount of countable earnings, and no payment is 
made if a person’s countable earnings are greater than 
the maximum monthly SSI payment.) In addition, 
recipients whose payments stop because of high earn-
ings can remain on Medicaid as long as their annual 
earnings are below a much higher threshold (which 
varies by state but typically is around $32,000 per 
year), even after they become ineligible for SSI. 
 SSI’s “expedited reinstatement” program allows recipi-
ents whose eligibility has ended because of increased 
earnings to return to the program within five years 
without filing a new application if their earnings 
subsequently decline enough that they become eligible 
again.
Two other programs have been created to assist recipients 
in returning to work, although neither appears to have 
been very successful. Under one, recipients can set up 
what is known as a Plan to Achieve Self Support, or 
PASS, which allows them to exclude from SSI eligibility 
calculations any savings for education, equipment, or 
other resources needed to get a better job. Under such a 
plan, a recipient’s monthly SSI payments are not affected 
by those savings. The other program, called the Ticket to 
Work Program, was designed to help recipients prepare 
for and find employment. Ticket to Work is federally 
funded, but its services are provided by state or local 
governments or by private organizations. 
Despite those provisions of SSI and the existence of those 
two programs, however, most SSI recipients do not work, 
and most disabled-adult recipients remain on the pro-
gram indefinitely. Each month just 5 percent of disabled 
SSI recipients report earnings, and each year only about 
0.5 percent leave the program because their earnings 
increase.27 The programs probably have a limited effect in 
part because some SSI recipients decide not to participate 
in them but also because some do not fully understand 
the opportunities to work while remaining on SSI.
Approaches to Changing SSI
Proposals for changing SSI—some that would expand the 
program and others that would shrink it—can be 
grouped into four categories:
24. See Subcommittee on Human Resources of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means, hearing on Supplemental Security Income 
for Children (October 27, 2011), http://go.usa.gov/Ykqk; and 
Patricia Wen, “The Other Welfare,” Boston Globe, December 12–
14, 2010, www.boston.com/news/health/specials/New_Welfare.
25. Shawn Fremstad and Rebecca Vallas, Supplemental Security Income 
for Children with Disabilities, Social Security Brief 40 (National 
Academy of Social Insurance, November 2012), www.nasi.org/
research/2012/supplemental-security-income-children
-disabilities.
26. One report identified “no evidence of a change in labor supply 
in response to child SSI enrollment.” See Mark G. Duggan and 
Melissa Schettini Kearney, “The Impact of Child SSI Enrollment 
on Household Outcomes,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, vol. 26, no. 4 (Fall 2007), pp. 861–886, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.v26:4/issuetoc.
27. See SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2011 (September 2012), 
Table 40, http://go.usa.gov/Y4rR; and Paul O’Leary, Gina A. 
Livermore, and David C. Stapleton, “Employment of Individuals 
in the Social Security Disability Programs,” Social Security 
Bulletin, vol. 71, no. 3 (August 2011), pp.1–10, http://go.usa.gov/
g22P.
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 Those that would adjust the parameters of the 
program, such as payment amounts or income or 
asset thresholds;
 Those that would change the criteria used to 
determine eligibility for SSI on the basis of disability; 
 Those that would establish more-frequent reviews of 
recipients’ continuing eligibility; and
 Those that would more fundamentally change the 
program, for example expanding programs to support 
work by people who qualify for SSI under current law, 
creating a separate program for children, or transfer-
ring control of the program to the states.
Estimating the effects of those changes on the federal 
budget is not possible without detailed specifications for 
how each would work. CBO has previously produced 
cost estimates for three well-defined options for changing 
SSI (see Box 1): using an alternative measure of inflation 
to adjust for price changes over time, eliminating the $20 
exclusion for unearned income, and reducing total pay-
ments to families with more than one child recipient.28 
This report focuses on broader potential changes to the 
program but does not include cost estimates for those 
changes.29
Program Parameters
SSI outlays could be adjusted by changing payment 
amounts or by changing the income and asset thresholds. 
For example, if policymakers wanted to increase future 
payment amounts relative to what they will be under 
current law, they could choose to link changes in those 
amounts to changes in wages. Under current law, the 
maximum monthly federal payment—in 2012, $698 for 
an individual and $1,048 for a couple—rises with average 
prices and thus has been unchanged in real terms since 
SSI was created in 1974; over that period, average real 
earnings in the economy have increased by about 30 per-
cent. Alternatively, if policymakers wanted to decrease 
future payment amounts relative to what they will be 
under current law, they could choose to freeze those 
amounts in nominal terms (that is, at the dollar amount 
in effect at that time) rather than stay with current law, 
under which payments increase with changes in average 
prices.
Policymakers also could increase future SSI outlays rela-
tive to what they will be under current law by raising the 
asset thresholds and thereby increasing the number of 
people who would be eligible to receive payments. SSI’s 
asset thresholds have been constant, with no adjustment 
for inflation, since 1984, whereas prices have more than 
doubled since then. To make the threshold match its 
amount in 1984 in real terms (as measured by the 
CPI-W), the asset threshold for a single person would 
have to increase from $2,000 to about $4,400. The asset 
rules also could be relaxed by narrowing the types of 
assets considered—for example, by disregarding assets 
held in retirement accounts.30 Alternatively, policymakers 
could reduce future SSI outlays relative to what they will 
be under current law by setting asset thresholds below 
their current amounts.
Any increase in the program’s total payments that stems 
from changes in monthly payment amounts or asset 
thresholds would increase federal outlays. If policymakers 
wanted to obtain offsetting savings within SSI, they could 
adjust other parameters of the program. For example, the 
substantial gainful activity amount could be reduced; 
or—as discussed in Box 1—rather than excluding the 
first $20 of unearned income, all unearned income could 
28. See Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, vol. 2 
(August 2009).
29. Policies to change SSI by changing the definition of disability or 
supporting work opportunities could also affect DI because the 
programs currently use the same definition of disability and some 
programs to support work are offered to participants in both 
programs. For additional discussion, see Congressional Budget 
Office, Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program (July 2012). For discussion of possible approaches to sup-
porting work for people with disabilities, see David H. Autor and 
Mark Duggan, Supporting Work: A Proposal for Modernizing the 
U.S. Disability Insurance System (Hamilton Project: December 
2010), www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/supporting_work_a
_proposal_for_modernizing_the_u.s._disability_insuran; 
David Mann and David Stapleton, A Roadmap to a 21st-Century 
Disability Policy, Issue Brief, 12-01 (Center for Studying 
Disability Policy, Mathematica Policy Research, January 2012), 
www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/pdfs/disability/
roadmap_ib.pdf; and Richard Burkhauser and Mary Daly, 
The Declining Work and Welfare of People With Disabilities 
(American Enterprise Institute, 2011), www.aei.org/book/
economics/the-declining-work-and-welfare-of-people-with
-disabilities/.
30. Robert Greenstein and Zoë Neuberger, Removing Barriers to 
Retirement Saving in Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income, 
Retirement Security Project Policy Brief 2008-3 (Brookings 
Institution, October 2008), www.brookings.edu/about/projects/
retirementsecurity/resources.
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Box 1.
Cost Estimates for Three SSI Options
As part of its analysis of various options for the fed-
eral budget, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
has estimated the cost of three well-specified changes 
to the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.1 
In each case, CBO estimated the effect on SSI spend-
ing over a 10-year projection period, from fiscal year 
2013 to fiscal year 2022. 
Option 1. Use an Alternative Measure of 
Inflation to Adjust for Price Changes Over Time 
According to many analysts, the consumer price 
index for urban wage earners and clerical workers 
(CPI-W) overstates increases in the cost of living 
because of the limited size of the sample of goods 
used to compute it and because it does not fully 
account for the fact that consumers generally adjust 
their spending patterns as some prices change relative 
to others.2 
One option for lawmakers would be to link SSI pay-
ment adjustments to another measure of inflation—
the chained CPI—which is designed to account fully 
for changes in spending patterns. The chained CPI 
has grown more slowly than the traditional CPI-W—
by an average of about 0.25 percentage points per 
year over the past decade—so indexing payments to 
the chained measure instead of the CPI-W would 
reduce federal spending. Applying the chained 
CPI starting in 2014 would reduce SSI outlays by 
$6.7 billion over the 2014–2022 period, a reduction 
of about 1 percent of total SSI outlays over that 
period. (That estimate assumes that the same change 
would apply to Social Security benefits, and thus that 
those benefits also would be reduced relative to 
current law. SSI payments for dual beneficiaries are 
lower when Social Security benefits are higher, so the 
reduction in SSI spending from this option would be 
larger if Social Security benefits were unchanged.) 
Option 2. Eliminate the $20 Exclusion for 
Unearned Income 
Counting all unearned income in the formula for 
determining payments, instead of excluding the first 
$20 of unearned income per month as under 
current law, would save $8.6 billion over the 10-year 
projection period if it began in 2013 and continued 
thereafter. Some current recipients who receive $20 
or less in monthly federal SSI payments would no 
longer be eligible for the program; others would still 
receive payments, but the monthly amounts would 
be up to $20 less. 
Option 3. Create a Sliding Scale for Children’s 
SSI Payments on the Basis of the Number of 
Recipients in a Family 
Currently, families receive an equal amount for each 
child recipient. However, economies of scale in some 
types of consumption—housing, in particular—
mean that two children generally do not need twice 
the income to be supported as well as one child. 
This option would not change the amount a family 
received for one child but it would reduce the 
amount for each additional child recipient. (A similar 
approach is followed by other programs, such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.) Under 
this option, proposed by the 1995 National Commis-
sion on Childhood Disability, payments would equal 
the SSI federal benefit rate multiplied by the number 
of child recipients in the family and raised to the 
power of 0.7. Creating such a sliding scale on the 
basis of the number of recipients in a family, begin-
ning in 2013, would save $4.6 billion over the 
2013–2022 period.
1. See Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, vol. 2 
(August 2009).
2. See Ralph Bradley, “Analytical Bias Reduction for Small Sam-
ples in the US Consumer Price Index,” Journal of Business 
and Economic Statistics, vol. 25, no. 3 (2007), pp. 337–346, 
http://amstat.tandfonline.com/toc/ubes20/25/3.
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be included in the payment computation. Similarly, any 
decrease in total payments that stemmed from changes in 
monthly payment amounts or asset thresholds would 
decrease federal outlays; if policymakers wanted to use 
those savings within SSI, they could adjust other 
parameters of the program. 
Determining Disability Status
Policymakers could adjust the rules used to determine 
whether applicants are disabled. Payments could be 
adjusted to account for the severity of a disability, 
for example, as is the case for veterans’ disability 
compensation. Under such a system of partial disability, 
payments would be reduced for some current participants 
who would be classified as partially rather than fully dis-
abled. But some people whose disabilities are not severe 
enough to qualify for SSI under current rules would 
probably be considered partially disabled and become eli-
gible for SSI, thus increasing the total number of recipi-
ents. In addition, such a system would be more complex 
than the current system.
Program Administration
Increased administrative efforts, such as more frequent 
CDRs and redeterminations, would require additional 
federal outlays for administration but would probably 
reduce outlays for payments. CDRs are used to evaluate 
whether a recipient continues to meet SSI’s definition of 
disability; redeterminations evaluate whether a recipient 
continues to meet SSI’s other eligibility criteria, most of 
which concern income and assets. The required CDRs 
of low-birth-weight infants on their first birthday and of 
disabled children who have reached age 18 frequently 
result in a termination of payments. Such an outcome is 
a less likely result of CDRs for other disabled children 
or for adults, which SSA performs infrequently (less than 
1 percent of those recipients are subjected to review each 
year). Eligibility is terminated in about 20 percent of the 
reviews for other disabled children and in less than 
5 percent of reviews for adults.
In recent years, funding for CDRs and redeterminations 
has increased, rising from about $500 million in fiscal 
year 2009 to $758 million in fiscal year 2011 and to 
$757 million in fiscal year 2012. (Those funds also 
support CDRs for the Social Security DI program.) In 
addition, the Budget Control Act of 2011 established 
adjustments to the caps on discretionary funding for 
additional spending on such efforts through 2021. If 
appropriated by the Congress, moderate increases in 
spending for CDRs and redeterminations from the 
amounts projected under current law would probably 
reduce future SSI payments by more than the amount of 
the additional spending for program administration and 
therefore would reduce federal outlays overall. However, 
the resulting reduction in projected payments would not 
be taken into account under the Congressional score-
keeping rules that CBO follows when it estimates the 
budgetary effects of legislation.31 CBO estimated that the 
adjustments to spending for CDRs and redeterminations 
allowed in the Budget Control Act would generate sav-
ings in payments that would be more than three times the 
amount of additional spending for administration over 
the coming decade, and additional savings would occur 
in years after that.32 As such spending increased, however, 
the number of ineligible recipients would decline, and 
each additional dollar of spending beyond the specified 
adjustments would have a smaller effect on payments.
Changes in the way that the disability determination pro-
cess is administered could alter the number and type of 
people who become SSI recipients. An applicant’s like-
lihood of qualifying for SSI payments depends in part on 
the detailed federal regulations, known as listings, that 
define disability.33 Other, less-well-defined aspects of the 
disability determination process also are influential, as 
evidenced by the large variation in state DDS approval 
31. In guidelines published in the conference report for the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33), Scorekeeping Rule 3 
states that “entitlements and other mandatory programs . . . will 
be scored at current law levels . . . unless Congressional action 
modifies the authorization legislation.” That is, even when 
additional discretionary funding for the administration of such 
programs would be projected to lead to budgetary savings from 
reduced benefit payments, such savings would not be counted as 
reductions in spending for the purposes of scorekeeping.
32. See Congressional Budget Office, letter to the Honorable John 
Boehner and the Honorable Harry Reid, concerning CBO’s 
analysis of the August 1 Budget Control Act (August 1, 2011). For 
discussion of the frequency of CDRs for child recipients, see 
Government Accountability Office, Supplementary Security 
Income: Better Management Oversight Needed for Children’s Benefits, 
GAO-12-497 (June 2012), http://go.usa.gov/YkwT. 
33. See Social Security Administration, Disability Evaluation 
Under Social Security, Blue Book SSA 64-039, ICN 468600 
(September 2008), http://go.usa.gov/YkwA.
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rates and by the variation between the rulings of individ-
ual examiners and judges. For example, in 2010, the 
Mississippi DDS approved 24 percent of SSI disability 
claims, whereas the Alaska DDS approved 56 percent.34 
However, because the reasons for such variations are not 
well-understood, it is not known what the effects of 
specific administrative changes would be.
Broader Changes
Lawmakers also could choose to make more fundamental 
changes to SSI. For example, additional employment 
assistance could be provided in an attempt to reduce 
the number of SSI recipients; the child and adult 
components of SSI could be separated; or the funding 
mechanism for SSI could be changed to a block grant 
model, turning administrative responsibility for the 
program over to the states.
Employment Assistance for Applicants. If lawmakers 
wanted to reduce the movement of disabled workers into 
SSI, they could consider several policy changes. For 
example, to reduce the number of applicants for the pro-
gram, the government could support the employment of 
people who appear likely to apply for it. Alternatively, or 
in addition, to reduce the number of people who become 
recipients, the government could provide employment 
support to those who chose to apply for SSI. Such efforts 
could be implemented through a new program or 
through the numerous other programs that support 
employment for people with disabilities.35 Assistance also 
could be developed to improve the prospects for the 
future employment of child recipients of SSI.36
The approach of offering employment support before an 
SSI application is made, rather than only after payments 
have been awarded, has received attention in part because 
of the lack of successful programs to encourage work 
among SSI recipients. Earlier intervention might be 
more effective because participants would be more likely 
to have a recent work history. Participants also might 
be more open to trying to find work if they have not 
completed the SSI application process, which requires 
them to actively demonstrate that they cannot work. 
Even if such an approach substantially reduced assistance 
to people who were not working, however, it could 
increase total costs to the government, depending on the 
form and extent of assistance supporting potential SSI 
applicants. For example, total costs could increase if 
employment assistance was not well-targeted and thus 
assisted many people who would not have qualified for 
federal payments in any case. Total costs also could go up 
if the new program was not effective at increasing 
employment and thus did not significantly reduce the 
overall number of SSI recipients.
Separate Program for Children. If lawmakers believed 
that the goals of SSI payments for adults were very differ-
ent from those of SSI payments for children, they could 
create separate programs for adults and children. In par-
ticular, disabled adults receive SSI payments because they 
cannot work, whereas disabled children are not expected 
to work, and SSI payments to their families are intended 
to assist parents or guardians who can face additional 
costs because of the need to care for those children. 
Limiting the current SSI program to adults and creating a 
separate program for children might make it easier to 
ensure that appropriate services are provided to children 
and their families and to integrate SSI with other educa-
tional, medical, and social services.37 In addition, the 
Social Security Administration’s expertise lies more in 
determining eligibility and distributing payments than in 
providing services to recipients, so a separate program for 
children might be better administered by state or local 
agencies. Whether such a change would increase or 
decrease administrative costs or total payment outlays 
would depend on how a new program was implemented.
Block Grants to States. If lawmakers wanted to limit 
federal responsibility for SSI, they might consider 
34. See Social Security Advisory Board, “G. Variation in DDS Deci-
sion Making,” in Aspects of Disability Decision Making: Data and 
Materials (February 2012), pp. 43–55, http://go.usa.gov/YkGH. 
35. See Government Accountability Office, Employment for People 
with Disabilities: Little Is Known About the Effectiveness of Frag-
mented and Overlapping Programs, GAO-12-677 (June 2012), 
http://go.usa.gov/YkzH. 
36. Ron Haskins, The SSI Program for Children: Time for Change? 
Princeton-Brookings Policy Brief (Spring 2012), 
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/
22_01_PolicyBrief.pdf.
37. Michael Wiseman, “Supplemental Security Income for the 
Second Decade,” Poverty and Public Policy, vol. 3, no. 1 
(March 2011), pp. 16–19.
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transferring control of the program to the states. One way 
to do so would be to provide block grants to states, essen-
tially making SSI function more like TANF. That shift 
could transfer much of the decisionmaking power for SSI 
from the federal government to the states, depending on 
the conditions attached to the grants. For instance, the 
states’ authority could be expanded to allow them to set 
full payment amounts instead of just state supplements, 
to devise their own eligibility requirements, and to decide 
whether to redirect funds to such support services as job 
training and education. 
Federal policymakers could decide either to set the block 
grants at fixed dollar amounts or to allow the grants to 
vary over time, perhaps along with average prices or some 
other variable. The cost of the program to the federal 
government would be determined by the structure of the 
block grants, the initial amount of spending, and the rate 
of increase over time. Under such an approach, the num-
ber of recipients and the type and amount of support 
provided could be lower or higher than under current 
law. Federal outlays probably would be more predictable, 
and if states kept the current practice of making pay-
ments to all people eligible for the program, their 
spending would be more variable. States would have 
much greater flexibility in designing system rules and 
would have an incentive to limit spending in excess of 
the grants they received. 
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